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Abstract
In this paper we extend the cheap talk model of Crawford and Sobel (1982) to a
multidimensional state space. We provide a characterization of equilibria. Most impor-
tantly, we prove that inﬂuential equilibria are non-generic when the conﬂict between
the sender and the receiver is too large. Thus, adding more dimensions cannot improve
upon information revelation when interests are too divergent.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The seminal work of Crawford and Sobel (1982) on cheap talk, has paved the way for a
vast literature applying cheap talk models to various contexts. Cheap talk is, for example,
the model for explaining lobbying behavior; lobbies and interest groups are considered to
exert political inﬂuence merely by convincing politicians, through casual communication,
to take the ‘right’ policies.1 Research in political economy also uses cheap talk to explain
the structure of committees in the Congress and the constitutional rules which dictate their
activities.2 In ﬁnancial economics, cheap talk models explain the behavior of experts in
ﬁnancial markets and in particular the phenomenon of herding.3 Others explain social
behavior such as political correctness.4
The work of Crawford and Sobel (1982), however, as most of the applications of cheap
talk models, focuses on a policy space of one dimension. In this paper we extend the basic
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1On this line of research, see the survey in Grossman and Helpman (2001).
2See for example Austen-Smith (1990) and Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987),(1989).
3In this literature, investment decisions are cheap talk messages about experts’ abilities, which allow
them to acquire good reputation. See for example Trueman (1994) and Levy (2003).
4Morris (2001).
1cheap talk model to a multidimensional environment. That is, we analyze a cheap talk game
between one sender (the informed type) and one receiver (who takes an action following
the communication with the sender), when the relevant information as well as the conﬂict
between the sender and the receiver is multidimensional. We characterize the nature of
equilibria and focus on the question of feasibility of information transmission, when the
conﬂict of interests between the sender and the receiver is very large.
To be more speciﬁc, there are two players in the model, a sender and a receiver. The
receiver has to choose a policy in a multidimensional policy space. The appropriate choice
of policy depends on the realization of a (multidimensional) state of the world. The receiver
initially has a prior distribution on the state of the world. The sender on the other hand
is informed about the state, and transmits a message about it to the receiver before the
receiver takes her action. The utility of both the sender and the receiver depend on the
action and on the state of the world.5 But they diﬀer in their optimal choice of action given
the state of the world, i.e., there is a conﬂict of interests. We then analyze the scope for
information transmission depending on the magnitude of the conﬂict between the players.
The insight in the unidimensional analysis of Crawford and Sobel (1982) is that informa-
tion transmission is not feasible when interests are suﬃciently divergent. When the conﬂict
between the players is too large, the sender would always prefer the receiver to take the most
extreme action. Thus, no matter what is the real state of the world, he would always send
the same message - the one which induces the receiver to take the most extreme action with
the highest probability. This means that this message, or any other, cannot be informative
about the type of the sender.
In the multidimensional world, however, there is some intuition which points otherwise.
Some ‘bundling’ of the dimensions may occur in equilibrium, even when the conﬂict is very
large. For example, if the sender prefers a higher action than the receiver on each dimension,
he may use in equilibrium messages such as ‘x is low but y is high’. The message gains
credibility because it is unfavorable for the sender on the x dimension. It is nonetheless
worthwhile for the sender to transmit it, since he gets his way on the y dimension and, given
his type, it is better for him than sending the other equilibrium message that translates as
‘y is low and x is high’.
To be phrased more precisely, this intuition relies on the idea that when there are many
dimensions, we can always span the space by a dimension (vector) of the conﬂict, and
a dimension on which the sender and the receiver agree on. On this latter dimension,
the interests of the sender and the receiver are aligned. The sender should be willing to
5We focus on the case in which the utilities are functions of the Euclidean distances of the state from the
actual action on each dimension. This is the common assumption in the literature; we take this assumption
in order to give the model its best change of yielding applicable results.
2transmit any information on this dimension, disregarding the magnitude of the conﬂict. It
may even be possible for him to transmit all the information on this dimension, implying
an equilibrium with inﬁnitely many credible messages.6
The following graph in the two-dimensional policy space is helpful for understanding the
intuition for the possible existence of an equilibrium with inﬁnitely many messages. Let
us focus on Euclidean preferences, i.e., the utility of a player decreases with the distance
from his ideal policy. The receiver’s ideal policy is the true state of the world whereas the
sender’s ideal policy is removed from it by the vector b, for any state of the world. The
graph depicts the vector of conﬂict, b. The orthogonal line to the vector b is the dimension
on which the sender and the receiver ‘agree on’, the line BB. That is, if a sender could
‘choose’ an action on the line BB, he would choose the ‘most truthful’ action; all senders
who know that the state of the world is on some line AA, parallel to the vector b, would
prefer action a among the points on BB. Their ideal policy, that is the state of the world
removed by the vector b, is also on the line AA or on its continuation, and the point a is
closest to them on the line BB. This is true for any magnitude of the vector b, and in
particular for very large conﬂicts in which the vector b could be imagined as stretching to
inﬁnity. Similarly, all senders on the line A0A0 would rather choose a0 (ignore a00 for the
time being):
6The intuition relies on works by Austen-Smith (1993a) and more recently, Battaglini (2002). These
papers are the exception in the literature, since they analyze a multidimensional policy space. However,
they analyze models with many informed senders whereas our model extends the basic cheap talk model,
with one sender, to a multidimensional environment. We discuss the related literature, and in particular
Battaglini (2002), at the end of this section. The intuition about multidimensional analysis is also indicated
in Spector (2000). His model is very diﬀerent from the rest of the literature as he analyzes a repeated game











Figure 1: All senders on AA prefer a on the line BB whereas all senders on A0A0 choose a0
on BB.
Thus, it seems that in equilibrium, the sender may be willing to transmit all informa-
tion on the line BB, i.e., that inﬁnitely many credible messages can be transmitted in
equilibrium. A closer look at this suggested reporting strategy reveals a problem however
in sustaining it in equilibrium. If the receiver observes a message advocating a, she under-
stands that the real state of the world is somewhere on the AA line. She then updates her
beliefs about the state of the world. These beliefs are surly on the line AA since these are
expectations over this set of states. Her beliefs, however, do not necessarily coincide with
the point a. Suppose that the receiver’s expectations over the set of states in AA coincide
with some point a00 on the line AA and a0 on the line A0A0.
But then an equilibrium cannot exist; when the conﬂi c ti sv e r yl a r g e ,a sw es h o wi nt h e
paper, the vector of the conﬂict becomes the most important dimension for the sender.
This dimension looms large and any two actions whose coordinates diﬀer in the dimension
of the conﬂict, b, cannot be equilibrium actions. For large conﬂicts, as in the unidimensional
world, the sender would always choose to induce the most extreme action on the dimension
of the conﬂict. In the above case, senders both on AA and on A0A0 would prefer to induce
a00.7
In other words, there is indeed a dimension on which the sender and the receiver agree
on; but the sender would transmit information on this dimension only under the condition
7T h ec o o r d i n a t eo fa
0 on the vector b is at the origin and that of a
00 is to the north-east of the origin.
4that this information would not aﬀect the action of the receiver on the dimension of the
conﬂict. Generically however, these two dimensions will not be independently distributed.
Information about the dimension on which the sender and the receiver agree on, would
imply how the state of the world is likely to be distributed on the dimension of the conﬂict.
Thus, the receiver would change his choice on the dimension of the conﬂict upon observing
information on other dimensions and as a result, the sender cannot transmit inﬁnitely many
messages in equilibrium.8
An equilibrium with inﬁnitely many messages may not exist, but this may be a too
ambitious requirement for very large conﬂi c t s .I tm a yb et h ec a s et h a ta ne q u i l i b r i u mw i t h
few messages may hold, such as the ‘bundling’ equilibrium described above, with the sender
just stating whether ‘x is low and y is high’ or the other way around. As we show, however,
when the conﬂict is large enough, the existence of equilibria even with a ﬁnite or small
number of informative messages are non-generic.
The results are therefore as follows. We ﬁrst characterize the set of equilibria for one
sender in the multidimensional state space. This characterization illustrates that there is
a genuine diﬀerence between a model with one dimension of conﬂict and more than one
dimension. When the conﬂict is small, informative equilibria exist and can be characterized
by partitions of the space, as in the unidimensional policy space. However, as opposed to the
equilibria in the unidimensional model, the elements of the partition are of diﬀerent shapes,
and the partition depends on the shape of the original state space. Moreover, whereas in
the unidimensional policy space the existence of an equilibrium with n informative messages
implies the existence of an equilibrium with n − k informative messages for some integer
k ∈ (0,n), this is not true any more in the multidimensional policy space.
We then focus our analysis on very large conﬂicts. We show that in the limit, when the
level of the conﬂict converges to inﬁnity, the conditions for inﬂuential equilibria, i.e., equi-
libria in which the receiver may take diﬀerent actions, are too stringent. When the conﬂict
becomes very large, it implies that the distance between typical actions that the receiver
may take and the sender’s ideal point, increases. In this case, we show that one dimension
of the policy space becomes more and more important. In the limit as this distance goes to
inﬁnity, the preferences of the sender become lexicographic; ﬁrst, alternatives are compared
only on this important dimension. If that comparison is inconclusive, a comparison along
ad i ﬀerent dimension determines the preferences.
This allows us to show that inﬂuential equilibria are non-generic for large conﬂicts. First,
we ﬁnd conditions on the parameters of the model (when essentially the ‘important’ dimen-
sions described above are not distributed independently), so that there is no informative
8This indicates that commitment on behalf of the receiver would have facilitated information transmission.
On the issue of commitment in the unidimensional state space, see Dessein (2002).
5equilibrium when the conﬂict is too large. For example, this is the case when the state
space is a circle, the prior distribution is uniform, and the sender values each dimension
diﬀerently. Or, this is the case when the state space is a square, the prior distribution is
uniform, the conﬂict on each dimension is of the same degree, but the sender values each
dimension diﬀerently.
For all other parameters, we show that even when the conditions for equilibria are satisﬁed
in the limit, then inﬂuential equilibria are non-generic, that is, for any equilibrium there is
a set of perturbations that upsets the equilibrium. We then establish the continuity of the
problem, so that if inﬂuential equilibria do not exist in the limit, indeed there exist large
enough degrees of the conﬂi c ts ot h a ti n ﬂuential equilibria cannot be sustained for these
parameters as well.
Other features of the work of Crawford and Sobel (1982) have been previously extended,
mainly with the purpose of retrieving equilibria with information transmission when the
conﬂict of interests is relatively large. Krishna and Morgan (2001) analyze the case of two
senders and one dimension of conﬂict. They show that more information can be revealed
when a receiver communicates with two senders instead of one, as long as the senders’
interests are biased in opposite directions. Farrell and Gibbons (1989) show that the exis-
tence of two receivers may facilitate information transmission.9 Aumann and Hart (2003)
and Krishna and Morgan (2002) analyze models in which the receiver is also allowed to
communicate, even though she is not informed. Her messages allow the players to conduct
joint lotteries. These increase the degree of information transmitted, but still cannot induce
informative equilibria when the interests are too divergent.
The most related to our paper are works of Battaglini (2002) and of Chakraborty and
Harbaugh (2003). Battaglini (2003) also analyzes a model with a multidimensional state
space. In his model, there are two senders who both know the state of the world. He shows
that in this case all information can be revealed in equilibrium, disregarding the magnitude
of the conﬂict of interests. In the fully revealing equilibrium, the state space is spanned by
two vectors; each of these vectors is the dimension on which the receiver has no conﬂict with
one of the senders. Each sender then truthfully tells the receiver the coordinate of the state
of the world on this dimension. This informati o nr e v e l a t i o ni sf e a s i b l ei nam o d e lw i t ht w o
senders, because one sender’s message on a particular dimension indeed does not change
the action of the receiver on other dimensions, and in particular on the dimension of the
conﬂict. This is because the receiver ‘already’ knows the exact information on the dimension
of the conﬂict, extracted from the report of the other sender. Our work stresses therefore
that such a result cannot in general hold when there is only one sender. In particular, it is
not only that full information transmission is not feasible, but that generically, equilibria
9For an application of this idea to international relations see Levy and Razin (2003).
6with any information transmission are not robust.
Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2003) study the conditions on utility functions which allow
the existence of the two actions ‘bundling’ equilibrium described above, for all degrees of
conﬂict. Our analysis shows that for a subset of the utility functions they identify, that is,
the ones that we analyze in this paper, this equilibrium is non generic.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the model.
In section 3 we characterize the equilibria of the model, as well as illustrate how these
diﬀer from the unidimensional model of Crawford and Sobel (1982). Section 4 analyzes
equilibria when there is a high degree of conﬂict between the sender and the receiver. In
this section we present Theorem 1, our main result about the non-genericity of inﬂuential
equilibria. Section 5 concludes by discussing some extensions, notably to the case of an
informed receiver and many senders.
2T h e m o d e l
An individual (the receiver) has to choose a policy in a multi-dimensional policy space, <d.
The appropriate choice of policy depends on the realization of a state of the world θ, in a
compact and convex subset of <d denoted by Θ. The receiver initially holds an atomless
and continuous prior distribution on the states in Θ denoted by F with a strictly positive
density function f on Θ and expectation at the origin. Assume that the receiver always
chooses policy at the expectation of θ, E(θ), according to his posterior.10
A sender, who is fully informed about θ, has preferences over the actions of the receiver
that are represented by his ideal point b =( b1,b 2,...,b d) and by a strictly decreasing utility




αi(ai − (bi + θi))2.
Note that the vector α (without loss of generality we assume that all its elements are
strictly positive and sum up to one) denotes the relative importance of the diﬀerent dimen-
sions in the preferences of the sender.
The game that we analyze takes the following form: The sender observes the state of the
world, θ. He then chooses a message m in a set of messages M = Θ. We analyze (weak)
Perfect Bayesian equilibria of this game.
In what follows we focus our analysis on the case of d =2 . All our results carry over to
the case in which d>2.
10The assumption that the receiver chooses policy at the expectation is taken for simplicity. Moreover, it
is consistent with the receiver maximizing a utility function that is quadratic in the distance of policy from
the origin.
73 Characterization of equilibria
In this section we characterize the equilibria in the game. We discuss the relation between
the Crawford and Sobel (1982) model (henceforth CS) of one-dimensional cheap talk and
our multidimensional model. As in CS, we show in Proposition 1 that any equilibrium is
almost surely equivalent in terms of outcomes to an equilibrium in ‘partition form’. In such
equilibria, the set of types is partitioned into convex sets and all agents in each element of
the partition induce, with probability one, the same action.
Unlike the CS model, the partition form of equilibria is not very useful for deriving
other applicable results. We illustrate the diﬀerence between the one dimensional and the
multidimensional models. First, we show that there is no consistency in the shapes of the
elements of typical equilibrium partitions. Second, we show that the set Θ a n di np a r t i c u l a r
its shape plays an important role in determining the set of equilibria. These two observations
imply that generally it is diﬃcult to use algorithms to ﬁnd equilibria, as opposed to the CS
equilibria.
Finally, in contrast to the CS model, we illustrate that the non-existence of an equilibrium
with k induced actions, does not imply the non-existence of equilibria with more than k
induced actions. The implication of this observation is that in the multidimensional model
it is more diﬃcult to characterize the ‘most informative’ equilibrium.
Strategies and equilibrium As t r a t e g yo fp l a y e rt y p eθ is a probability distribution,
mθ over the set of messages M. For any action m ∈ M, let a(m) denote the action chosen
by the receiver.
An equilibrium is a pair of a strategy function m : Θ → ∆(M) (denoted by mθ) for the
sender and a belief function for the receiver, f(θ|m), satisfying:









(3) f(θ|m) is updated using Bayes rule whenever possible.
Remark 1 An equilibrium always exists (babbling).
Proposition 1 Any equilibrium is almost surely equivalent in outcomes to an equilibrium
in which the type space is partitioned into convex sets. All types of senders in the same set
induce the same action, and each type induces it with probability one.
8Proposition 1 shows an analogy with the unidimensional model of CS. The rest of this
section is devoted to some observations on the equilibria of the game. In particular, using
examples, we show how the form of equilibria, although reminiscent of the unidimensional
partitions equilibria of the CS model, has diﬀerent features.
Comparison with Crawford and Sobel (1982) Recall that the main features of the
equilibria in the unidimensional model of CS are as follows. In any equilibrium, the elements
of the partition are intervals of straight lines. Such an informative equilibrium exists if the
conﬂict is small enough, for any ‘shape’ (i.e., length) of the unidimensional state space.
Also, an equilibrium with k induced actions implies the existence of an equilibrium with
fewer than k messages, for any unidimensional state space. As we now show, none of this
holds in the multidimensional model.
Observation I In a typical equilibrium the elements of the partition of the state space
have diﬀerent shapes.
We illustrate this observation by an example of an equilibrium with two induced actions,
for the state space Θ =[ 0 ,1] × [0,1]. We assume that the prior distribution over the state
space (the square) is uniform. In the equilibrium, the square is divided to two groups
of senders, each of them sending a diﬀerent message. We have computed a particular
equilibrium for (b1,b 2)=( .4,.3),(α1,α2)=( .5,.5). In this equilibrium, all types (θ1,θ2)
below the line
θ2 = λθ1 + γ
for {γ = −.2705,λ =1 .0325}, send the same message and induce the action a =( .754,.254),
whereas all types (θ1,θ2) above this line send a diﬀerent message and induce the action





Figure 2: An equilibrium in the square, with two actions.
9The actions are the expectations over the set of states represented by each group of
senders, whereas it can be easily veriﬁed that the dividing line consists of the types who are
indiﬀerent between the two actions. This implies that the strategy described constitutes a
best response for each sender. Moreover, this equilibrium is robust to small changes in the
parameters b and α, or in the prior distribution.
As can be seen in this equilibrium, the elements of the partitions diﬀer; the two subsets
do not have the same shape. This is in contrast to the unidimensional analysis in which all
elements of the partitions are straight lines which diﬀer only in their length.
Remark 2 This example also illustrates what we term the ‘bundling’ eﬀect. On each of
the dimensions, the conﬂict has bi ≥ 1
4 which implies that a cheap talk game on each di-
mension separaetely results in babbling only and no credible information can be transmitted.
However, information transmission is feasible once the two dimensions are bundled. In par-
ticular, the sender who always wants a higher action than the receiver would take, trades-oﬀ
unfavourable information on one dimension (admitting it has a low value) with favourable
information on the other dimension (that it has a relatively high value).
Observation II The ‘shape‘ of Θ may determine the characteristics of equilibria.
To illustrate how the shape of Θ may matter, consider now a state space in the form of a
circle, i.e., Θ = {θ1,θ2|θ2
1 + θ2
2 ≤ r} and assume that the prior distribution over the states
is uniform. We show that for all conﬂicts (b1,b 2), generically, there is no equilibrium with
two induced actions.
If such an equilibrium exists, by Proposition 1, it must have the following form. There
are two convex and closed subsets of senders. Each subset induces a diﬀerent action. These
actions, a =( a1,a 2) and a0 =( a0
1,a 0
2) are expectations over the two subsets. The two
subsets are separated by the set of types who are indiﬀerent between the two actions; in
particular, the types of senders θ =( θ1,θ2) who are indiﬀerent between the two actions



























However, given the straight separating line and the uniform distribution, the expectations
over each subset must be on a line which is orthogonal to the line of the indiﬀerent types.











11This follows from (weighted) Euclidean preferences. The formal derivation of this equation is in the
p r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .
10where the left-hand-side is the slope of the line of indiﬀerent types as deﬁned in the previous
equation, and the right-hand-side is the slope orthogonal to that between the two induced
actions. As seen from this condition, this equation can hold iﬀ α1 = α2. Thus, equilibria
with two induced actions generically do not exist in the circle when the prior distribution
is uniform.
However, in observation I, we show that if the state space is a square, equilibria with two
induced actions hold and are generic. Equilibria are therefore shape-dependent. In par-
ticular, the state space can be detrimental regarding whether information revelation exists
at all. Again, this marks a diﬀerence between the multidimensional and a unidimensional
game.
Observation III If an equilibrium with k induced actions does not exist, it does not
imply that an equilibrium with more than k induced actions doesn’t exist.
In observation II we show that generically it is impossible to support an equilibrium
with two diﬀerent induced actions when the state space’s boundary is a circle and the prior
distribution is uniform. This is true for any vector of conﬂict b. In particular, it is also true
for b1 = b2 =0 . However, note that in this case, i.e., when there is no conﬂict, there exists
an equilibrium with full information transmission, in which the sender reveals the true state
and the receiver takes this as her action. This highlights therefore another diﬀerence from
the unidimensional analysis, in which the non-existence of an equilibrium with k induced
actions implies the non-existence of an equilibrium with more than k induced actions.
4 Equilibria with high levels of conﬂicts
In this section we analyze the set of equilibria when the conﬂict between the sender and the
receiver is large. In what follows we increase the distance between the ideal point of the
sender and the origin in the direction of the vector b,ar a yw i t hs l o p eb2
b1. Denote by b the
norm of b, i.e., b = ||b||. Finally, let β∗ = −α1
α2
b1





loss of generality that |β∗| ∈ (0,∞).
We focus our analysis on inﬂuential equilibria:
Definition 1 An equilibrium is inﬂuential if there exist at least two messages m,m0
such that a(m) 6= a(m0).
Our ﬁrst result is an important building block of what will follow. When the conﬂict
becomes very large, it implies that the distance between typical actions that the receiver
may take and the sender’s ideal point, increases. In this case, we show that one dimension
of the policy space becomes more and more important. In the limit as this distance goes to
inﬁnity, the preferences of the sender become lexicographic; ﬁrst, alternatives are compared
only on this important dimension. If that comparison is inconclusive, a comparison along
11ad i ﬀerent dimension determines the preferences.
In equilibrium, if there are two distinct induced actions, it must be that some types are
indiﬀerent between these two actions. Together with the above discussion, this implies that
for high degrees of conﬂict, any two distinct actions induced in equilibrium must both lie
approximately on a line with a particular slope. This intuition is now formalized:











1 − β∗| ≤ ε; (ii) The set of
sender types who are indiﬀerent between these two actions is a line with slope δ such that
|δ − δ∗| ≤ ε.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 :(i) For any b, if there are two distinct actions, a0 =( a0
1,a 0
2)
and a00 =( a00
1,a 00
2), induced in equilibrium, there must be some sender type θ0 that is























First suppose that a0
1 = a00
1. This implies that the left-hand-side of (2) is 0 and therefore to





2) − 2(b2 + θ0
2)) = 0
But since the actions are distant from one another, a00
2 6= a0













2 is bounded, equation (2) is violated. Consider then the case of a0
1 6= a00
1









































Note that any induced action must be in (the compact set) Θ. M o r e o v e r ,i tm u s tb et h a t
both b1 and b2 are growing to inﬁnity as b converges to inﬁnity. This implies that the
right hand side of (4) is converging to α1b1


















2) induced in equilibrium, look at a typical
type, θ0, who is indiﬀerent between the two actions. This type should satisfy (1) and





















































Proposition 2 puts very stringent conditions on the existence of equilibria. The ﬁrst part
states that all induced actions will tend to be distributed on a particular line of slope β∗.
The second part states that the types who support each action will be in a subset of Θ with
boundaries which tend to be lines with slope δ∗.








2 ) is indiﬀerent between the two actions for all
b. This is the mid-point between the two actions and is hence equidistant from both. When









2 ) is trivially on this line, as well as on the line of indiﬀerent types, it implies
that the two actions converge to be equidistant from the line of indiﬀerent types in the
β∗−dimension.
This implication of Proposition 2 discussed above will play an important role in our
analysis. It allows us to translate the preferences of the sender, when the conﬂict is very
large, to lexicographic preferences. The relevant dimensions become the lines of slopes β∗
and δ∗. First, as part (i) of Proposition 1 shows, the sender prefers the action which is on a
line with a slope β∗ that is closest to him, as if his indiﬀerence curves are linear with a slope
β∗. If both actions are on the same line with a slope β∗, as we discuss above, the sender
prefers the action that is on the closest line with a slope δ∗ - closest on the β∗ direction.
Below, we show that this tight structure implies that generically inﬂuential equilibria will
not exist.
A reformulation Proposition 2 established the conditions for the existence of equilibria
for very large conﬂi c t s .W en o wu s et h e s er e s u l t st or e - construct the mathematical formu-
lation of the problem, which would enable us to prove that generically, inﬂuential equilibria
do not exist when the conﬂict is very large.
To make things simpler, we build a new coordinate system with respect to the slopes β∗
and δ∗. L e tu sb l o c kt h es e tΘ with two δ∗ and two β∗ lines that are tangent to Θ.W e
denote one of the points of intersection between a δ∗ and a β∗ line, say the south-west point,
as (0,0) and let the two lines crossing at (0,0) span the space. Similarly one can denote the
13three other intersections by (¯ x,0) and (0, ¯ y) and (¯ x, ¯ y), with the convention that the new
x − axis is the dimension of slope β∗ and the y − axis that of slope δ∗. For any θ ∈ Θ,
let (x,y) be the same point expressed in the new coordinate system and let the set Θ be
mapped into the set Θ∗.
Denote the marginal distribution on the y − axis as fδ∗
(y) deﬁned on (0, ¯ y) and the
marginal distribution on the x − axis as fβ∗
(x) deﬁned on (0, ¯ x). Finally, we term the
reaction curve, γ(x), as the expectations over y for values of y for which (x,y) ∈ Θ∗, i.e.,
γ(x)=E[y|(x,y) ∈ Θ∗].
Figure 3 illustrates the new coordinate system, and depicts an example of γ(x).T h e
dashed lines in Θ∗ are lines with slope δ∗ and γ(x) is the expectations over each of these


















Figure 3: The new coordinate system.
In this new coordinate system, we propose to consider the following two problems. First,
think of partitioning Θ∗ into ‘strips’ with boundaries that are lines with a slope δ∗, such
that the expectations taken on any two neighboring strips are equidistant (with respect to
direction β∗) from the line that separates them. Figure 4a illustrates a solution to such a
problem. It is a vector x =( 0 ,x 2,x 3, ¯ x), that induces the expectations (a1,a 2,a 3), which










The second problem that we consider is partitioning Θ∗ into such strips as well, with
boundaries that are lines with a slope δ∗, but in a way so that the expectations taken
within each strip are all on the same line of slope β∗,t h a ti s ,t h e ya l lh a v et h es a m ev a l u e
of y. Figure 4b illustrates a solution to such a problem: the vector x0 =( 0 ,x 0
2,x 0




3) which are on a line with slope β∗. In the ﬁgure we also illustrate
the reaction curve γ(x), which is helpful in this problem; since γ(x) is the expected value
of y given a particular value of x, the expectations of the y−v a l u eo v e rs o m es t r i p(xi,x i+1)
for i ∈ {1,2,3} are essentially the expectations over γ(x) in this strip, where in these











We now present formally the two problems discussed above.
Problem A
15Av e c t o r(x1,..x k) ∈ (0, ¯ x)k,s u c ht h a txi ≤ xi+1 for all i ∈ (1,...,k−1), and k ≥ 3, is a











Av e c t o r(x1,..x k) ∈ (0, ¯ x)k,s u c ht h a txi ≤ xi+1 for all i ∈ (1,...,k−1), and k ≥ 3, is a













Problems A and B decompose therefore the conditions of Proposition 2 into two problems.
In particular, problem A is related to the implication of Proposition 2 that any two actions
converge to be equidistant - in the β∗ dimension - from the line of the indiﬀerent types.
Problem B relates to part (i) of Proposition 2, which establishes that all actions have
actually to converge to a line with a slope β∗. Both problems, A and B, rely on part (ii)
of Proposition 2, i.e., that the lines of indiﬀerent types converges to be with a slope δ∗.
Therefore, there is a close relation between the solutions for problems A and B and the
existence of equilibria.
In our main result we will show that these two problems, A and B, are independent and
that the existence of a solution to both problems is non-generic. This, as we will show, also
implies that inﬂuential equilibria are non-generic for large conﬂicts. Even before we prove
this formally, one can observe the following: a solution to problem A depends only on the
marginal distribution over x, fβ∗
(x), whereas the solution to problem B depends on fβ∗
(x)
as well as on γ(x).12 This implies that the set of solutions is independent. For example, if
we alter the reaction curve γ(x), without changing fβ∗
(x), the marginal distribution over x,
then the set of solutions for problem B may change whereas the set of solutions for problem
Ar e m a i n sﬁxed.
Our ﬁnal building block before presenting the main result is a characterization of the
solutions for problems A and B. For any two points, x,x0 ∈ [0, ¯ x], let
µ
y





12The solution to problem B depends therefore on the marginal on the y − axis only through the expec-
tations on that dimension.
16Definition 2 The reaction curve γ(x) satisﬁes the l−crossing property, if there are l
(ﬁnite) solutions to γ(x)=µy.
Proposition 3
(i) Problem A: the set of solutions to problem A is isomorphic to the set of equilibrium
outcomes of the model with Θ =[ 0 , ¯ x], ad e n s i t yf u n c t i o nfβ∗
(x) over Θ and b=0 (see
Crawford and Sobel, 1982). In particular, there exists a countable number of solutions.
(ii) Problem B: (a) if γ(x)=const then any vector (x1,..x k) is a solution to problem B.
(b) If the reaction curve γ(x) satisﬁes the l−crossing property, then there are at most a ﬁnite
number of solutions to problem B. (c) If the reaction curve γ(x) satisﬁes the one-crossing
property, then there does not exist a solution to B.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 :
(i) This follows from the analysis of Crawford and Sobel (1982).
(ii) (a)When γ(x)=c for all x, then for all i, and xi,x i−1,µ
y
xi,xi−1 = c. Therefore any
vector is a solution for B (note that this implies that if x and y are independently distributed
then every vector x is a solution for B).13
(ii) (b) We now construct an algorithm to compute the set of solutions for problem B.
We will show both that the algorithm provides a ﬁnite number of solutions, and that it
characterizes all the solutions to problem B.
Step 1: The algorithm
1. Start from x1 =0and ﬁnd the ﬁrst x ∈ (0, ¯ x] such that µ
y
0,x = µy.I f x =¯ x the
algorithm stops with no solution. If x<¯ x, denote x2 = x. Suppose we have deﬁn e di nt h i s
way xm,m≥ 2. Continue this process starting from xm. If there exists an x ∈ (xm, ¯ x) such
that µ
y
xm,x = µy we deﬁne xm+1 = x and proceed to the next step in the algorithm starting
with xm+1. If x =¯ x,w ed e ﬁne xm+1 =¯ x and the algorithm stops. Let k be the subscript
of the last point deﬁn e di nt h ea l g o r i t h m .
By the l− crossing property, the algorithm stops at a ﬁnite time. To see this, note
that there cannot be two points xi and xi+1 chosen by the algorithm that are between
two neighboring solutions of the equation γ(x)=µy (i.e., two ‘crossings’). If there were
such two points than either γ(x) >µ y or γ(x) <µ y in the strip deﬁned by (xi,x i+1), in
contradiction to the construction of the algorithm. Thus, since there is a ﬁnite number of
crossings, there must be ﬁnite number of solutions in the algorithm.
13In particular, this would imply that when x and y are independently distributed, then there exist
equilibria with any number of messages (recall that x and y are not the original dimensions of the problem
but correspond to the β
∗ and δ
∗ dimensions).
172. The set of solutions to problem B proposed by the algorithm is any (ordered) vector
(x0
1,...,x 0
m), 3 ≤ m ≤ k, such that x0
1 =0 ,x 0
m =¯ x and x0
i ∈ {x2,...,xk−1} for all i =
2,....m − 1.
Step 2: The solutions proposed by the algorithm are the only solutions for problem B.
First, it is easy to show that in any solution x of problem B µ
y
xi,xi+1 = µy. This follows
from the fact that µ
y
xi,xi+1 are equal valued for any pair xi,x i+1 in x and that a weighted
average of them must equal to the expectation under the prior, µy. In particular then, it is
also the case that µ
y
0,xi = µy for all xi which are part of a solution x.
Second, suppose that we ﬁnd a solution (x0
1,...,x 0
k) but it is not characterized by the
algorithm above. In particular, suppose that x0
i is not part of any solution above. It is
therefore in between some xm and xm+1 which were characterized by the algorithm. In
this case, µ
y








= µy. This is however in
contradiction to the deﬁnition of xm+1, since xm+1 is the smallest value of x>x m so that
µ
y
xm,x = µy. So (x0
1,...,x 0
k) must be part of a solution found by the algorithm.
(ii) (c) If there is a single crossing of γ(x) with µy this implies that the above algorithm





0,x >µ y. To see this, let x0 solve γ(x0)=µy. For any x<x 0,µ
y
0,x 6= µy, and for any
x>x 0,µ
y
x,¯ x 6= µy, but in the solution µ
y
x,¯ x = µy has to be satisﬁed. This concludes the
proof.¥
The implication of Proposition 3 is that the existence of a solution which solves both
problems A and B simultaneously, seems highly unlikely. We investigate this more formally
in Theorem 1.
Part (c) of the Proposition already provides suﬃcient conditions for the non-existence of
a solution to problem B. To see that these situations are generic, consider the state space
bounded by a circle, where the prior distribution is uniform. In the circle, the reaction
curve γ(x), which is the expectations over lines with slope δ∗ (as the dotted lines in ﬁgure
5), is always orthogonal to δ∗.µ y is the β∗−projection of the prior on the δ∗−dimension.
If β∗ = − 1
δ∗, then γ(x)=µy for all x ∈ [0, ¯ x]. In this case any vector of points in [0, ¯ x] is
a solution of Problem B. However, whenever β∗ 6= − 1
δ∗, as depicted in ﬁgure 5, then γ(x)










Figure 5: In the circle there are generically no solutions to probelm B.
The example of the square, with a uniform distribution, is similar. Let δ∗ =1 .T h e n
γ(x) is the diagonal with a slope −1 (i.e., it is expectations over lines such as the dotted
lines).If β∗ = −1, as in the circle example, then γ(x)=µy for all x ∈ [0, ¯ x]. Again, in this
case, depicted in ﬁgure 6a, any ordered vector of points in [0, ¯ x] is a solution to Problem B.
However, for any β∗ 6= −1, the one-crossing property is satisﬁed, and there does not exist











Figure 6a (left) in which every vector is a solution to problem B and ﬁgure 6b (right)
which shows that generically in the square, problem B has no solution.
Note that the one-crossing property satisﬁed above, or more generally the l−crossing
property, is a property of the relation between the distribution function F(.) and the slopes
δ∗ and β∗. That is, it is not a property of a distribution function alone, but a joint property
of the prior distribution and the other primitives of the model, the ratio of the conﬂict on
each dimension and the weight that the sender places on each of the dimensions.
19The main result We can now present the theorem. Let Solution(A) and Solution(B)
be the sets of solutions of problems A and B respectively.
Theorem 1 (i) If Solution(A)∩Solution(B)=φ then there exists a ¯ b such that for all
b>¯ b there exists no inﬂuential equilibrium; (ii) Suppose that Solution(A)∩Solution(B)6= ∅.
Then there exists a set of perturbations of the distribution function F(θ∗) on Θ∗ such that
Solution(A)∩Solution(B)= ∅.
The ﬁrst part of the Theorem relates problems A and B to the existence of an equilibrium
for high levels of conﬂict. That is, it states that if there is no common solution to problem
A and B, then for high levels of conﬂict, indeed there is no inﬂuential equilibrium. The
second part of Theorem 1 establishes that a solution to both problem A and problem B is
non-generic. In the remaining of this section, we explain the intuition for the proof in two
steps, starting with the second part.
The non-genericity of a common solution to problems A and B
We establish the non-genericity of common solutions to A and B in the following way.
We construct perturbations to the distribution function which change the set of solutions
for problem B while maintaining the set of solutions for problem A, so that none of the new
solutions for problem B can coincide with any of the solutions in A.
First recall that a solution to problem B must satisfy that for all i, and xi,x i−1,µ
y
xi,xi+1 =
µy, and moreover, by the algorithm that we have constructed, it also satisﬁes that for all
i, µ
y
0,xi+1 = µy. We now focus on perturbations to γ(x), whereas we maintained ﬁxed the
marginal density over x,fβ∗
(x). Recall that this type of perturbation will not alter the set
of solutions for problem A.
Let us take for example any (small) local perturbation which alters γ(x) in some strip
xi,x i+1, which therefore changes the prior in that strip, µ
y
xi,xi+1, and as a result changes










Figure 7: An example of a perturbation.
In the original solution, all the actions a1,a 2 and a3 are on a line with slope β∗ that goes
through µy. There is a small and local perturbation of the reaction curve γ(x) represented
by the dashed line, in the strip between 0 and x2 which changes µ
y
0,x1 ‘downward’ to ˆ µ
y
0,x1.
This perturbation moves µy ‘downward’, and the dashed line with slope β∗ goes through
the new prior, denoted by ˆ µy.N o t et h a tµy has changed less than the local change in µ
y
0,x1.





x2,x3 6=ˆ µy and µ
y
x3,¯ x 6=ˆ µy since the expectations on these latter strips have not changed.
Moreover, neither of the components of this solution can be part of a diﬀerent solution,
since also µ
y
0,x2 6=ˆ µy and µ
y
0,x3 6=ˆ µy. This implies that any former solution to problem B is
not a solution any more.
To complete the intuition for part (ii), we note the following. Generically, whenever there
is a slight change in the prior µy, any new solution to problem B is only slightly diﬀerent from
one of the original solutions. This implies that following the perturbations, Solution(A) ∩
Solution(B) is empty, because any previous solution corresponded to a solution in A but
since the set of solutions of A is not a continuum, none of the new solutions to B is a solution
to problem A.
The inexistence of inﬂuential equilibria for large conﬂict
The ﬁnal step of our analysis, is to establish the continuity of the problem. This is
complicated by the feature that if an equilibrium with k messages does not exist, it does
not imply that an equilibrium with more than k messages does not exist (see observation
III in section 3). Therefore, one cannot prove that no inﬂuential equilibria exist if there is
no equilibrium with two diﬀerent actions (as opposed to the unidimensional model).
In the proof of the ﬁrst part of the theorem we therefore show that the statement is
true for all cases of sequences of equilibria when b converges to inﬁnity, those in which the
21number of induced actions is bounded by some ﬁnite number and those in which the number
of induced actions converges to inﬁnity. For the case of equilibria with ﬁnite actions, we
prove that the problem exhibits continuity in the limit, when b converges to inﬁnity.
We now illustrate the proof for the inﬁnite case; that is, we demonstrate that when
Solution(A)∩Solution(B)=φ, then there is no sequence of equilibria with inﬁnitely many
induced actions. Assume, by way of contradiction, that such a sequence of equilibria exist.
In particular, there must exist a convergent subsequence of these equilibria in which all the
a c t i o n sc o n v e r g et ob eo ns o m el i n ew i t hs l o p eβ∗ (this must also be the line that goes
through µy). We can then show that this line of actions with a slope β∗ must cover Θ, that
is, the measure of types which support each action must be zero.
We now reach a contradiction to the existence of such a sequence of equilibria in the
f o l l o w i n gw a y .W el o o ka tas t r i pi nw h i c ht h ec o n v e xh u l lo ft h er e a c t i o nc u r v eγ(x) and
the line of actions with a slope β∗ do not intersect, i.e., are distant from one another; we
can always ﬁnd such a strip. If there is no such strip, then essentially γ(x) is the line with
as l o p eβ∗ which goes through µy, which implies that any vector is a solution to problem
B. This would therefore be in contradiction to the condition in the theorem which demands
that Solution(A) ∩ Solution(B)=φ.
On this strip, we can compute the expectations over θ. On the one hand, we can take
expectations over the reaction curve γ(x) which intersects this strip. These expectations
a r et h e r e f o r ei nt h ec o n v e xh u l lo fγ(x). This is simply another way to take expectations;
we ﬁrst take expectations over the lines of slope δ∗ (which is how we constructed γ(x)) that
intersect this strip, and then weigh each of these expectations by the measure of its relevant
line.
On the other hand, we can take expectations in this interval by taking some weighted
average of the actions induced in equilibrium. Since all of them must fall on the same line
with a slope β∗, their convex combination must be on this line as well, and in the part
which intersects the strip.
But now we reach a contradiction, because the expectations cannot be both on the line
of slope β∗ a n di nt h ec o n v e xh u l lo fγ(x), by the way we have constructed this strip. Thus,
when Solution(A) ∩ Solution(B)=φ, there cannot exist an equilibrium with inﬁnitely
many actions when the conﬂict is too large.
An Example
Let us re-visit the state space of a square, i.e., Θ =[ 0 ,1]2, with the uniform distribution
as the prior distribution. Let b1 = b2 ≥ 0 and α1 = α2 = 1
2. In this case, β∗ = −1=− 1
δ∗
and γ(x) identiﬁes with a line of slope β∗ that goes through the prior expectations. This
case is depicted in ﬁgure 6a. Indeed, for any b1 = b2, there exists an inﬂuential equilibrium
22with inﬁnitely many messages; all senders with the type θ2 = θ1 + λ for λ ∈ [−1,1] send
the same message λ and the receiver takes an action (1−λ
2 , 1+λ
2 ). This equilibrium can be
approximated by the limit of a sequence of a common solutions for problems A and B, when
we increase the size of the vector x, i.e., when we let k converge to inﬁnity.
However, when the conﬂict is very large this equilibrium is non-generic, that is, it is not
robust to small changes in the parameters of the model. For example, any local change in
the uniform distribution that would slightly change γ(x), will knock down this equilibrium,
as Theorem 1 implies. But moreover, if for example we replace the assumption of α1 = α2
by any other values for these parameters, there is no inﬂuential equilibrium at all.I nt h i s
case, as in ﬁgure 6b, β∗ 6= −1 and therefore γ(x) satisﬁes the one-crossing property with
respect to the line with a slope β∗ 6= −1 that goes through the prior. From Proposition 3
we then know that there is no solution to problem B, which by Theorem 1 implies that no
informative messages can be sustained in equilibrium.
We ﬁnd this example important, ﬁrst, because it demonstrates that any changes to the
parameters of the model, not only to the distribution function as presented in Theorem 1,
can upset inﬂuential equilibria. Thus, there are also other perturbation, on top of those
speciﬁed in Theorem 1, that induce non-genericity of inﬂuential equilibria. This is a conse-
quence of the fact that the l− crossing property that we have deﬁned, is a property satisﬁed
jointly by all parameters of the model and not by the distribution function alone. Second,
it may seem attractive in applications to use the symmetric case of b1 = b2 and α1 = α2.
We emphasize here that this case may be misleading since results regarding information
revelation are completely diﬀerent for all other parameters.
5 Discussion
We have shown that in the limit, inﬂuential equilibria are non-generic, that is, for any
equilibrium there is a set of perturbations that upsets the equilibrium. We have focused on
perturbations to the distribution function over the state space, but one can easily construct
many other perturbations, such as to the state space itself, or to the other primitives of the
models - the parameters describing the direction of the conﬂict or the relative weights of
the diﬀerent dimensions in the sender’s utility function. In addition, we have established
the continuity of the problem, so that if inﬂuential equilibria do not exist in the limit,
indeed there exist large enough degrees of the conﬂict so that inﬂuential equilibria cannot
be sustained for these parameters as well. In what follows, we discuss some extensions of
our results.
Informed receiver In our model the sender has a perfect private signal about the state
of the world, whereas the receiver only knows its prior distribution function. Let us change
this now and assume that the receiver also has a private signal about the state of the world,
23although, in order to keep things interesting, his signal is not perfect.
The main diﬀerence from our basic model now is that the sender, when transmitting his
message, perceives the receiver’s action as a lottery. This is because he does not know the
exact signal of the receiver. In an inﬂuential equilibrium, diﬀerent messages will induce lot-
teries with diﬀerent support, whereas any two types of senders who send the same message,
would face a lottery with the same support but with a diﬀerent probability distribution
over these lotteries (since they view diﬀerently the probability distribution over the signals
of the receiver).
We conjecture that our results would hold for this environment as well. In particular, it is
easy to extend the result in Proposition 2; if there are two diﬀerent messages in equilibrium,
then all types of senders who are indiﬀerent between the two messages, must perceive the
expectations over the lotteries induced by these two messages as converging to be on a line
with a slope β∗.
Many senders Another natural way to extend our paper is to increase the number of
senders. In particular, it would be interesting to consider the case of the senders being
imperfectly informed, i.e., each of them has a conditionally independent signal about the
state of the world.14
Note that the case of many senders bears strategic resemblance to the case of an informed
receiver described above. In particular, when one sender considers which messages to trans-
mit, he perceives the receiver as informed and the receiver’s action as a lottery, since other
senders may have provided the receiver with some private information. We believe that we
can therefore extend our results to this case as well.15
Compactness of the state space In the model an important assumption is the com-
pactness of the state space, Θ. This assumption is crucial in the proof of Proposition 2 and
therefore for the results stated in Theorem 1. In particular, when the state space is R2,
inﬂuential equilibria may exist for any degree of conﬂict.
14If all the senders are equally informed, then as Battaglini (2002) have shown, for any level of conﬂict
there exists an equilibrium with full information revelation. The equilibrium has the particular feature that
from the point of view of each sender, any of his messages will indeed induce an action on the same line with
as l o p eβ
∗.
15Several papers have analyzed models with many senders who have imperfect signals. Austen-Smith,
(1990) and (1993b), analyzes the case of imperfectly informed senders and compares the information proper-
ties of the equilibria with either joint or sequential messages. Wolinsky (2002) shows how allowing communi-
cation among the experts may increase information revelation. These papers focus on a unidimensional state
space. In Austen-Smith (1993a) the multidimensional state space is analyzed, to study experts’ incentives
to acquire information. Recently, Battaglini (2003) showed that it is possible to extract information from
many senders who have imperfect signal, in a multidimensional environment, for some particular distribution
functions. Whether this holds for other assumptions awaits future research.
24Our results may be generalized to cover this case also. Assume that the state space
is R2 but that the distribution F has ﬁnite expectations. We are currently working on
an extension of Theorem 1 to this new environment. We conjecture that as the degree
of conﬂict increases, the probability that more than one action is induced in equilibrium
converges to zero. In contrast to the case of a compact state space, in this environment our
result about inﬂuential equilibria would be therefore in terms of probabilistic limits.
Generalizing the utility function The focus of this paper has been to show why the
CS approach to model strategic information transmission, may be limited in a multidimen-
sional state space. In this respect, the assumptions on the utility functions were chosen to
correspond to those in the literature. This gives the model its best chance to yield applica-
ble results. Although the results could be extended to more general utility speciﬁcations,
our analysis proves that this approach may be futile.
The analysis in the paper highlights an interesting point about the CS modelling approach
and modeling information transmission in general. It is easy to ﬁnd speciﬁcations of utilities
under which even in the one dimensional model it would be diﬃcult to ﬁnd inﬂuential
equilibria. The assumptions underling the analysis in CS, which amount to assumptions
linking the state space and the policy space, guarantee that this is not the case. One
possible direction of future research, in the multidimensional state space, is to ﬁnd other
speciﬁcations of utilities, under which, inﬂuential equilibria may arise.
25Appendix
Deﬁnitions and notation For any a0,a 00 ∈ <d, let d(a0,a 00)=||a0 −a00||. For any a ∈ Rd




Let a,a0 ∈ <d be two actions. We deﬁne the set of agents that weakly and strictly prefer
a to a0, by, R(a,a0)={θ ∈ Θ|U(a|θ) > U(a0|θ)} and P(a,a0)={θ ∈ Θ|U(a|θ) >U(a0|θ)}.
By Proposition 2, the set of indiﬀerent types between a and a0 is a line. Let la,a0
denote
t h el i n eo fi n d i ﬀerent types between two induced actions in equilibrium, a and a0. We say
that two induced actions are neighbors if there exists θ ∈ la,a0
∩Bdry(S(a))∩Bdry(S(a0)).
Finally, let A be a ‘well deﬁned’ set, the measure of A is M(A)=
R
A dF.
For any induced action a, we deﬁne the support set of a as the set of types that induce
a with a strictly positive density, i.e., for any a ∈ A,
S(a)={θ ∈ Θ|∃m ∈ M such that a(m)=a and mθ(m) > 0}
For any equilibrium with a set of induced actions A, and any induced action a, deﬁne the
potential support set of a, ¯ S(a), by ¯ S(a)=
T
a06=a,a0∈A R(a,a0). Types that are not in ¯ S(a)
do not induce a.D e ﬁne the deﬁnite support set for a by S(a)=
T
a06=a,a0∈A P(a,a0). Types
that are in S(a) will choose to induce a with probability one.
Proofs of results P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :
Lemma 1 In any equilibrium and any induced action a ∈ A,
S(a) ⊆ S(a) ⊆ ¯ S(a).
Proof: Obviously if θ ∈ S(a), θ ∈ S(a) as a is an induced action and it gives type θ
maximal utility. If θ / ∈ ¯ S(a) there must exist a0 ∈ A such that U(a0|θ) >U (a|θ) and
therefore by the equilibrium conditions, θ / ∈ S(a).¤
Lemma 2 In any equilibrium and any induced action a ∈ A, M(¯ S(a)/S(a)) = 0.
Proof: For any a0 ∈ A, we have that M(R(a,a0)/P(a,a0)) = 0 as it is the set of types who
are indiﬀerent between the two actions. As preferences are Euclidean, this set is a line whose
measure is zero in Θ. Therefore, M(¯ S(a)/S(a)) = M(
T
˜ a6=a,˜ a∈A R(a,˜ a)/
T
˜ a6=a,˜ a∈A P(a,˜ a)) =
M(
T
˜ a6=a,˜ a∈A(R(a,˜ a)/P(a,˜ a)) ≤ M(R(a,a0)/P(a,a0)) = 0.¤
Finally, Lemma 3 characterizes the sets ¯ S(a) and S(a),
Lemma 3 (i) ¯ S(a) is a convex, closed set. (ii) S(a) is a convex set.
26Proof: (i) Since Θ is convex, for any ˜ a ∈ A, R(a,˜ a) is convex as it is the intersection
of Θ and a convex hyperplane. Therefore ¯ S(a)=
T
˜ a6=a,˜ a∈A R(a,˜ a) is convex. Moreover as
R(a,˜ a) is a closed set for any ˜ a ∈ Y, ¯ S(a) is closed.
(iii) Since Θ is convex, for any ˜ a ∈ A, P(a,˜ a) is convex as it is the intersection of Θ and
a convex hyperplane. Therefore ¯ S(a)=
T
˜ a6=a,˜ a∈A R(a,˜ a) is convex.¤
Lemmata 1,2 and 3 imply Proposition 1 as equilibria may diﬀer from one another in out-
comes only by having zero measure sets of types inducing diﬀerent actions in equilibrium.¥
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 :
P r o o fo fP a r t( i): we are considering a sequence of inﬂuential equilibria pertaining to
{bn}∞
n=0 with a corresponding set of induced actions An. We prove the following preliminary
results:
LEMMA 4 For any convex set C with strictly positive measure, η > 0, t h ed i s t a n c eo f
the expectation over C to the boundary of C is bounded from below by a strictly positive
number.




2 > 0, where λ(.) is an increas-
ing function. Fix η > 0. Look at all possible convex subsets of Θ with measure η. For any
such set C,d e ﬁne the width of C to be the smallest distance between any two parallel lines
that are tangent to C. Note that the width of C is bounded below by some λ(η) > 0, where
λ(η) is increasing. This is evident by the compactness of Θ and the strict positiveness of
f(.).
Fix a set C as above and ﬁnd the closest point, p, on the border of C to E(C). Let δC
be the slope of the tangent to C at that point. Now divide C into two equal measured
subsets by a line of slope δC. Denote the subset that includes p by U and the other by D.
E[C]=1
2E[U]+1
2E[D]. Note that U and D a r ec o n v e xs e t s . T h ed i s t a n c eo fp from D
must be at least λ(
η





LEMMA 5 For any sequence of two neighboring actions, {an,a 0
n}, either limM(S(an)) =
limM(S(a0
n)) = 0 or limM(S(an)) > 0 and limM(S(a0
n)) > 0.
Proof: Suppose that along the sequence, limM(S(an)) = 0 but limM(S(a0
n)) > 0. By
Lemma 4 this implies that lim||an − a0
n|| > 0. Moreover, lan,a0
n is part of the boundary of
S(an) and S(a0
n). By proposition 2 the boundaries all converge in slope to δ∗ and therefore
S(an) is converging to be a subset of lan,a0




n) > 0 which is a contradiction as lan,a0
n converges to pass through the midpoint
between an and a0
n.¤
The ﬁnite case:
27Suppose that for all n, the number of actions induced in equilibrium is bounded by some
ﬁnite k, i.e., 2 ≤ |An| ≤ k for any n. We can then ﬁnd a convergent subsequence of actions
Ank in which the actions converge to some set A such that |A| ≥ 2.
We show that all the actions along the sequence are bounded away from one another.
Lemma 6 There exists K such that for all k>K ,the lines of indiﬀerent types between
any two neighboring actions do not intersect in Θ.
Proof: We ﬁrst show that no two induced actions, along the sequence, converge to one
another. Suppose by way of contradiction that there exist two such actions, i.e., there exists
a subsequence of equilibria and two induced actions a0
nk,a 00




Note that for any two neighboring induced actions, a and ˜ a, a / ∈ IntS(˜ a).T h i s c a n
be seen as follows. a ∈ S(a) and therefore a ∈ R(a,˜ a). Therefore, a/ ∈ P(˜ a,a) and thus
a/ ∈ Int(S(˜ a)). By Lemma 4 this implies that if M(S(a)) is bounded below by some η > 0,
then the two neighboring actions, a and ˜ a, are bounded away from each other. Then
M(S(a0
nk)),M(S(a00
nk)) → 0. By Lemma 5 this implies that M(S(ank)) → 0 for any ank ∈
Ank. To see this note that there are a bounded number of induced actions in equilibrium, and
that all induced actions are connected under the “neighboring” relation. This contradicts
the supposition that there exist two actions which converge.
We know that any line la,a0
converges to pass through the midpoint on the line between
a and a0. Let us focus on any three induced actions a, a0 and a00 such that a and a0 are
neighbors and so are a0 and a00. By Proposition 2 and the above, the distance between the
midpoint between a and a0and that between a0 and a00 must be bounded below by some
strictly positive number. By the compactness of Θ and by Proposition 2, the lines must
converge to be parallel and thus, for high enough k, never cross within Θ.
Note also that any θ ∈ Θ that is strictly between two lines la,a0
and la0,a00
has the same
ordering of preferences over Ank and in particular has the same optimal actions. Moreover
as any such point is not on any indiﬀerence line, it must be that there is a unique induced
action that maximizes the types preference.¤
Using the reformulated coordinate system, let x =( 0 ,x 2,...,x |A|−1, ¯ x) represent the col-
lection of corresponding limit-indiﬀerence lines between the elements of A, i.e., each xi
represents the line {y|(xi,y) ∈ Θ∗}. Let us order the elements of |A| respectively with the
ordering of the x0s.
Lemma 7 x ∈ Solution(A) ∩ Solution(B).
Proof:
We will show that: (i) dβ∗(ai,x i+1)=dβ∗(ai+1,x i+1), for i =1 ,...,|A| − 1, (ii) ai =
28E[θ|x,y|xi,x i+1], and that (iii) All the ai lie on a line of slope β∗.
Note that (iii) follows from proposition 1. By Proposition 1 the line of indiﬀerence between
two actions converges to a slope of δ∗ and thus converges to the relevant xi. B y( i i i )w ek n o w
that the two actions are on a line of slope β∗ and thus the midpoint between the two actions
is on xi and indiﬀerent and thus β∗−equidistant from the two actions. This proves (i). We
now prove part (ii). Suppose that k>K(as in Lemma 6). On the sequence of equilibria
represented by {Ank}∞
k=1 and for an induced action ank → ai, deﬁne the set S∗(ank) to be
the largest convex set that is bordered by two lines of slope δ∗ and the contours of Θ∗ that
is a subset of S(ank). Note that by Lemma 6, this is well deﬁned. We now deﬁne a new
sequence of actions. For any k>K ,
a∗
nk = E(θ|θ ∈ S∗(ank)).
We ﬁrst show that limk→∞ ||a∗
nk − ank|| =0 . First, note that M(S(ank)/S∗(ank)) → 0
as S∗(ank) ⊂ S(ank),M (S(ank) > 0 and by Proposition 2 the slopes of the boundaries of
S(ank) converge to δ∗ and so S∗(ank) is converging to S(ank). Finally note that S∗(ank)
converges to the strip of Θ∗ bounded by lines of slope δ∗ passing through the points xi and
xi+1 on the reformulated x − axis.¤
This completes the proof of the ﬁnite case since we reach a contradiction.
Proof for the inﬁnite case:
We now prove the theorem for the case of inﬁnite actions. That is, suppose that along
the sequence of equilibria {An}∞
n=1 the number of induced actions is converging to inﬁnity.
LEMMA 8 When the number of induced actions converges to inﬁnity along the sequence
of equilibria, then for any induced action, an,M (S(an)) → 0.
Proof: Suppose that along the sequence there exists an induced action an such that
M(S(an)) 9 0. This implies, by Lemma 5, that for all its neighboring actions, ˜ an, also
M(S(˜ an)) 9 0 and so on. As a result for all actions induced in equilibrium the measure of
the support set is bounded away from 0, a contradiction because then only a ﬁnite number
of actions can be induced.¤
Now note that by Proposition 2, for high conﬂicts, all actions induced in equilibria must
be close to some line with slope β∗. Let lβ∗
be the line of slope β∗ passing through µy on
the reformulated y − axis.
Let D = {θ ∈ Θ∗|δ∗θ1 + γ0 ≥ θ2 ≥ δ∗θ1 + γ00} for some γ0,γ00 such that |γ0 − γ00| > 0 and
d(θ0,Co(Graph(γ(x)) ∩ D)) > λ for some λ > 0 for all θ0 ∈ D ∩ lβ∗
. To ﬁnd such a D we
need to know that there is an interval in which there is no inﬁnite crossing between the line
and the reaction curve γ(x) which must follow from the fact that the intersection of the
29solution for A and B is empty. This is because ﬁrst γ(x) is continuous and if it is exactly
on a line with slope β∗ then there is a solution for A and B together.
Let AD
n = {an ∈ An∩D}. Note that AD
n is not empty since that would be a contradiction
to Lemma 8. Recall that these actions must be close to lβ∗
. Since M(S(an)) → 0 for any
induced an, also S(an) ⊂ D almost surely for all an ∈ AD
n and there are no a0
n / ∈ D such
that S(a0
n) ⊂ D. Denote the expectations over D by E(D). We now take the expectation
over actions in AD
n . Each action is close to lβ∗
and is weighted by the measure of its support
group. But the diﬀerence between this expectations to E(D) must converge to 0, i.e.,
d(E(D),lβ∗
) → 0.
On the other hand, E(D) must converge to lie within the convex hull of Graph(γ(x))∩D.
Graph(γ(x)) ∩ D is the set of expectations over all lines with slope δ∗ that go through D.
But then d(E(D),Co(Graph(γ(x))∩D)) → 0. Taken together with d(E(D),lβ∗
) → 0, this is
in contradiction to the choice of D. Therefore, an equilibrium with inﬁnitely many induced
actions cannot be sustained.
This complete the proof of part (i) of Theorem 1.¤
P r o o fo fP a r t( ii):
We deﬁne a local perturbation to γ(x) as a perturbation in a strip [x0,x 00] such that for
any x ∈Solution(B) there exists an i such that [x0,x 00] ⊂ [xi−1,x i]. Due to the fact that any
solution to B is ﬁnite, this deﬁnition is not restrictive.
LEMMA 9 Suppose that x ∈Solution(A)∩Solution(B). Following any perturbation of F(.)
which maintains the same fβ∗
(x) but is a local perturbation to γ(x),t h e nx/ ∈Solution(A)∩Solution(B).
Proof: Denote by ˆ µy
xi−1,xi the values after the perturbation and by µ
y
xi−1,xi the val-
ues before the perturbation. With a local change in γ(x), then it must be that for any
x ∈Solution(A)∩Solution(B), then ˆ µy
xi−1,xi 6= µy for some unique i (since the local pertur-
bation is inside this strip). Thus, for any x0 which was part of a solution x to the original




x0,¯ x because by the algorithm of constructing solu-
tions to problem B it is either the case that xi ≤ x0, in which case ˆ µ
y
x0,¯ x = µy but ˆ µ
y
0,x0 6= µy
or that xi ≥ x0 in which case ˆ µ
y
0,x0 = µy but ˆ µ
y
x0,¯ x 6= µy. Thus, by the proof of Proposition
3, x0 cannot be a part of a new solution.¤
Denote by γ0(x) the perturbed reaction curve. Let ε =m a x d(γ0(x),γ(x)) and term
the set of perturbations described above as ε−perturbations. Let B denote the original
problem and B’ denote the problem after an ε−perturbation. Similarly, let x denote an
original solution and let x0 denote a solution after an ε−perturbation.
LEMMA 10 Following any ε−perturbation of F(.) then generically for any x0 ∈Solution(B’),
there exists an x∈Solution(B) such that limε→0|xi − x0
i| =0for all i,xi ∈ x and x0
i ∈ x0.
30Proof: Consider the original solution x ∈Solution(B). Generically, for any xj which is
part of this vector, then
dγ(x)
dx |x=xj > 0 or
dγ(x)
dx |x=xj < 0. Given a local perturbation in
some strip [xi−1,x i], the new prior is ˆ µy. Without loss of generality, assume that ˆ µy >µ y.
Consider now the algorithm of ﬁnding a solution to problem B, as outlined in the proof of
Proposition 3. In the new problem B’, the ﬁrst value of x0, deﬁned as x0











0,x2 for x2 which the smallest
value of x which satisﬁes µ
y
0,x2 = µy at the original problem. If then
dγ(x)
dx |x=x2 > (<)0 there
is a value x0
2 > (<)x2, such that limε→0|x2 − x0





same follows for all solutions of the algorithm.¤
We can now complete the proof of this part. Note that the set of solutions for A does
not change with an ε−perturbation. Following any such ε−perturbation, when ε is small
enough, then each original solution for B changes inﬁnitesimally. However, the set of solu-
tions for A is not a continuum. Then, no new solution for B can coincide with an original
solution for A. This complete part (ii) and the proof of Theorem 1.¥
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